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I. INTRODUCTION
Since corporate restructuring has become a common occurrence, it
is surprising that the United States Supreme Court had not addressed
until recently the issue of how to treat expenses incurred incident to cor-
porate restructuring by way of a friendly takeover. In Indopco, Inc. v.
Commissioner,' the Court granted certiorari 2 to resolve a dispute among
the circuit courts regarding when such expenditures may be deducted 3
1. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). In the Tax Court decision, Judge Clapp expressed surprise that,
despite the prevalence of takeovers in the modem corporate world, the issue had not been previously
litigated. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 72 (1989).
2. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
3. "Deduction" refers to "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988).
1
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and when they may be capitalized.4 A majority of circuit courts relied on
the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan
Ass'n, I ruling that a separate and distinct additional asset must be created
in order for an expense to be capitalized.6 However, in Indopco, the
Supreme Court upheld the Third Circuit's decision that in a friendly
takeover, the target corporation's associated expenses must be capitalized
because they provide a significant future benefit, even though there may
not be a separate and distinct additional asset created.7
Critics have asserted the Supreme Court departed from the Lincoln
Savings standard.' However, the Supreme Court explained that the pres-
ence of a separate and distinct additional asset is only one means of dis-
tinguishing capital expenses from currently deductible expenses. Where
an expense does not create a separate and distinct new asset, capitaliza-
tion may be the correct treatment if the expense provides a significant
future benefit. The Supreme Court limited its decision to "specific ex-
penditures at issue in this case," 9 thereby leaving unresolved whether
other friendly takeover expenses must be capitalized.
Since it was decided in 1971, a majority of the lower courts have
interpreted Lincoln Savings as requiring the creation of a separate and
distinct asset in order to capitalize expenses. 10 However, some lower
courts have not adopted such a bright-line rule, but have distinguished
between currently deductible expenses and capital expenses based on the
extent of the benefit provided in the future." This confusion prompted
the Supreme Court to review the Lincoln Savings decision,12 and Indopco
afforded this opportunity. The Indopco Court confirmed that Lincoln
Savings is applicable where an expense creates a separate and distinct
4. "Capitalization" means increasing the value of any property, in this instance, the target
corporation's stock. Id. § 263(a). Any tax benefit from capitalized expenses is realized not in the
current year, but either over many years, as in the case of depreciation or amortization deductions,
or all in the year of disposition, in the form of reduced gain or increased loss resulting from the
higher basis. Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 13,602-05 (1991); see infira notes 84, 90-96 and accom-
panying text.
5. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
6. See infra notes 49, 53, 57, 58, 61 and accompanying text.
7. 112 S. Ct. at 1046.
8. George B. Javaras & Todd F. Maynes, Do Briarcliff Candy and Code Section 195 Stiff
National Starch?, 49 TAx NoTEs 1223 (1990); William L. Raby, Expenses That Benefit the Future:
Indopco & The "White Knights", 54 TAx NoTEs 1648 (1992).
9. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
10. See infra notes 49, 53, 57, 58, 61 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 66, 100 and accompanying text.
12. See Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1042.
[Vol. 28:279
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asset and the asset is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for capital-
ization. 13 The Court determined that where a separate asset was not cre-
ated, the existence of a significant future benefit indicated the need for
capitalization. 4 The Court reasoned that a significant future benefit
analysis was properly based on precedent, the language of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), and the rationale behind the accounting principles
governing expenditures. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
did not overrule, nor did it depart from, its Lincoln Savings rationale.
Rather, the Court correctly expanded the Lincoln Savings decision to in-
clude a future benefit analysis.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
National Starch & Chemical Corporation (National Starch), the tax-
payer in Indopco, 5 manufactured and sold adhesives, starches, and spe-
cialty chemical products.16 National Starch had approximately 3,700
common shareholders and was traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change. 17 In 1977, Unilever Group, a purchaser of National Starch's
products,18 proposed a friendly takeover of National Starch. 19 National
Starch's major shareholder, Frank Greenwall,20 in agreement with the
other shareholders, favored the takeover.21 However, the Greenwalls in-
sisted they would dispose of their stock in a tax-free transaction only.22
Consequently, Unilever and National Starch devised a "reverse subsidi-
ary cash merger" which would produce a partially non-taxable ex-
change.23 Prior to the merger, National Starch's attorneys advised the
13. Id. at 1044.
14. IIL
15. National Starch & Chemical Corporation was renamed Indopco, Inc. Id. at 1041.
16. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 68 (1989).
17. Id.
18. See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 426 (3d Cir. 1990).
19. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 69.
20. Id. at 68. Frank Greenwall, chairman of the executive committee of the board of directors,
together with his wife, owned 14.5 percent of National Starch's outstanding common stock. Id. at
68-69.
21. See id. at 71.
22. Id. at 69; see also Thomas F. Quinn, Note, Takeover Expenses Incurred by the Acquired
Corporation - Not Just Another Ordinary Deduction: National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 10 J.L. & CoM. 167, 172 (1990). Frank Greenwall organized National Starch in 1928. Id.
at 172 n.31. In 1978, at the time of negotiating the takeover, the Greenwalls bad a very low basis in
their stock relative to the value of the company. Id. n.35. If the takeover were taxable, the large gain
on the sale would result in a large income tax liability. See id Because a stepped-up basis available
at death would obviate any capital gain tax, the Greenwalls were interested in the non-taxable ex-
change. Id.
23. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 427. The reverse-subsidiary cash merger entailed, in part,
exchanging stock for stock (tax free under Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code). Id.; National
1992]
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directors they had a fiduciary duty to ensure that the transaction would
be fair to the shareholders.24 Counsel suggested the directors consult
with an investment banking firm to obtain a valuation of National
Starch.25 Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (Morgan Stanley) was retained for
the valuation and gave a favorable report.26 The merger was approved
and finalized on August 15, 1978.27 For National Starch's short year
ending August 1978, it deducted Morgan Stanley's bill for services on its
income tax return.28 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed the
deduction and National Starch contested the disallowance. 29 The Tax
Court, the Third Circuit, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Commis-
sioner's decision to capitalize the expenses.3"
III. PRIOR CASE LAW
Based on the language of the Code,31 the distinction between
whether to deduct or capitalize an expense is readily apparent where a
tangible or identifiable intangible asset exists.32 However, the distinction
is less evident where expenses do not produce a tangible or readily identi-
fiable intangible asset.33 The Supreme Court has determined whether to
Starch, 93 T.C. at 69. National Starch's remaining stock would be purchased for cash by a special
subsidiary formed by Unilever. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 427.
24. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 427.
25. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 69-70. The attorneys advised that the directors of National
Starch "should retain an outside independent investment banking firm which would assist in the
valuation of [National Starch] and would be available in the event that either the Unilever Group or
a third party made a hostile or unsolicited tender offer." Id. at 70. The attorneys expressed further
that National Starch's "failure to retain such a firm might be evidence that they did not carry out
their fiduciary responsibilities." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 71.
28. Id. at 72. Morgan Stanley's bill for services was in the amount of $2,200,000.00. Id. In
addition, its bill for out-of-pocket expenses and legal fees totalled $7,586.23 and $18,000.00, respec-
tively. Id National Starch's attorneys submitted a bill for services in the amount of $490,000.00 and
out-of-pocket expenses totalling $15,069.00. Id. National Starch also incurred other expenses total-
ling $150,962.00 in connection with the transaction. Id. On its 1978 income tax return, National
Starch deducted the Morgan Stanley fee, but did not deduct the attorney fees or other expenses. Id.
29. Id. In addition, National Starch made a claim for the taxes attributable to the attorney fees
and other expenses that it had not deducted. Id.
30. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1040; National Starch, 918 F.2d at 426; National Starch, 93 T.C. at
78.
31. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1988) (defining capital expense as "[a]ny amount paid out for new build-
ings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or
estate").
32. Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 1379 n.7. The National Starch expenses were neither tangible nor identifiable intangi-
ble assets. See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 430-31 (3d Cir.
1990).
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss2/4
INDOPCO, INC. v. COMMISSIONER
currently deduct34 or capitalize35 some expenditures within this category.
However, where there is no established Supreme Court precedent regard-
ing other such expenditures, decisions vary.36
A. Lincoln Savings
Prior to 1971, lower court decisions regarding capital expenditures
and business expenses were confusing and inconsistent. Therefore, when
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 37 there appeared to be, at last, a paved road for the
lower courts to follow.
The Lincoln Savings dispute arose due to a new requirement that
savings and loan associations pay a premium in addition to their primary
deposit insurance premium." The issue was whether the additional pre-
mium was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
39
The Court recognized that the primary premiums were ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses' and were currently deductible because they
funded a primary reserve in which the savings and loan association had
no property interest.41  However, the additional premium created a re-
serve refundable to the institution upon termination of its insured status,
and, thus, the reserve constituted a capital asset.4 2 The Supreme Court
concluded that "[w]hat is important and controlling... is that the...
payment serves to create or enhance... what is essentially a separate and
34. See, eg., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (holding that legal expenses incurred
in defending against securities fraud charges were deductible under § 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943) (holding that legal expenses incurred in
disputing adverse postal designation are deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses).
35. See, eg., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (holding that consult-
ing, legal, and other professional fees incurred by acquiring firm in minority stock appraisal proceed-
ings are capital expenditures); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970) (classifying legal,
accounting, and appraisal expenses incurred in purchasing minority stock interest as capital expendi-
tures); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943) (holding that payment by
parent company to cover subsidiary's operating deficit is not deductible as a business expense).
36. See, eg., Ellis Banking, 688 F.2d at 1379 n.7; NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942
(4th Cir. 1981); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Briarcliff Candy
Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1957);
Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
37. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
38. Id. at 345. Section 404(d) of the National Housing Act required this additional premium.
Id.
39. Id. at 345-46.
40. See id. at 354.
41. Id. at 349.
42. Id. at 349-50.
1992]
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distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the pay-
ment is capital in nature and not an expense."43 The question arose as to
whether the creation of a separate and distinct additional asset is neces-
sary or merely sufficient to compel capitalization of expenditures. 4
B. Circuit Courts' Interpretations of Lincoln Savings
Only one year after its Lincoln Savings decision, the Supreme Court
again addressed the capitalization issue in United States v. Mississippi
Chemical Corp.45 There the Court determined that the expenses should
be capitalized since they were "of value in more than one taxable year"46
even though no identifiable separate and distinct additional asset was cre-
ated.47 The Mississippi Chemical decision would lead one to doubt that
Lincoln Savings established a bright-line rule. The majority of circuit
courts, however, virtually ignored the Mississippi Chemical decision. 48
Those courts illustrated their interpretation of Lincoln Savings as a
bright-line rule by holding that a separate and distinct asset was neces-
sary for capitalization.
In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,49 the Second Circuit, re-
lying on Lincoln Savings, held "[t]he presence of an ensuing benefit that
may have some future aspect is not controlling."50 The court further
held a separate and distinct additional asset is essential for capitaliza-
tion. ' I The Briarcliff court stated that Lincoln Savings "brought about a
radical shift in emphasis and direct[ed] the inquiry [to] ... whether [the
expenses] . . . 'created or enhanced ... what [was] essentially a separate
and distinct additional asset.' "52 This statement clearly reflects the Sec-
ond Circuit's interpretation of Lincoln Savings as a bright-line rule.
Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits used the Lincoln Savings "test"
but arrived at different conclusions due to divergent interpretations of
43. Id. at 354.
44. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 430.
45. 405 U.S. 298 (1972).
46. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 309.
48. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Mississippi Chemical on the basis that the "challenged
start-up expenses were... incurred during the tax year." Colorado Springs v. United States, 505
F.2d 1185, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 1974).
49. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. Id at 782 (citing Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 354).
51. Id. (citing Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 354).
52. Id. (quoting Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 354).
[Vol. 28:279
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nearly identical facts. In NCNB Corp. v. United States, 3 the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that amounts expended in creating a branch bank were cur-
rently deductible since the branch was only an expansion of NCNB's
existing business and no separate additional asset was created.5 4 The
court interpreted Lincoln Savings as "specifically reject[ing] the argu-
ment that the expenditure was not deductible simply because it had an
effect beyond one year.""5 This interpretation stemmed from the Lincoln
Savings language that" 'the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have
some future aspect is not controlling.' ,56 The Fifth Circuit, relying on
Lincoln Savings, concluded that the expenses associated with branch
banking must be capitalized since the bank held a property interest in its
separate branches. 7
In Honodel v. Commissioner,58 the Ninth Circuit also interpreted
Lincoln Savings as creating a bright-line rule. There the court held that
monthly, nonrefundable retainer fees which are based on a client's in-
come level as well as his financial planning, tax advice and investment
needs, should be capitalized. 9 The court reasoned that "[A]n expendi-





In Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States,61 the Tenth Cir-
cuit permitted the taxpayer to deduct certain costs incident to establish-
ing a credit card system since the bank's expenditures did not create a
salable property interest a.6  The court did, however, address its previous
use of the one-year rule which provided that where expenses are a benefit
realized in more than one year, they are capital. 63 The court found the
53. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 294.
55. Id. at 288.
56. Id. (quoting Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 354).
57. Central Texas Savings & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (5th Cir.
1984).
58. 722 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 1466.
60. Id. (citing Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 353).
61. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
62. Id. at 1192. The court adopted the language in Briarcliff that expenses incurred in develop-
ing a new sales territory are deductible. Id. at 1190-91. The Briarcliff court had also adopted the
Lincoln Savings separate and distinct asset test. Briarcliff, 475 F.2d at 782.
63. Id. at 1191-92 (citing United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957)).
1992]
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one-year test to be "no more than a factor for consideration" in deter-
mining capital expenses," and, therefore, based its decision on the Lin-
coln Savings bright-line rule."
Only the Eighth Circuit declined to interpret Lincoln Savings as a
bright-line rule. In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Commissioner,"
the court looked at the extent of the benefit received and permitted the
bank to take a current deduction for start-up costs incurred for a new
credit card system, finding that any future benefits were slight." Citing
Lincoln Savings, the court stated "[t]he fact that there may be some ensu-
ing benefit and future effect from the expenditure beyond the taxable year
when paid is not controlling."68 Additionally, the court found that the
expenses did not "constitute a separate and new business undertaking."69
IV. THE INDOPCO DEcIsIoN
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's National Starch 7 0
decision under the name of Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner,71 holding that
certain professional expenses incurred by a target corporation in the
course of a friendly takeover are not deductible as "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenses, but rather should be capitalized.72 The Court
also addressed the Lincoln Savings controversy, and concluded that the
creation of a separate and distinct additional asset is only one method for
determining whether expenses should be capitalized.73 If expenses do
not create a separate asset, they should still be capitalized if they provide
a significant future benefit.74 The Court reasoned that the Indopco ex-
penses did provide a significant future benefit and, therefore, held that
they were capital expenses.75
A. The Indopco Court's Interpretation of Lincoln Savings
Indopco expanded the Lincoln Savings rule "that a taxpayer's expen-
diture that 'serves to create or enhance. . . a separate and distinct' asset
64. Id. at 1192.
65. Id.
66. 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979).
67. Id. at 436.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990).
71. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). See supra note 15 regarding the corporate name change.
72. Id. at 1046 (citing I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988)).
73. Id. at 1044-45.
74. Id. at 1046.
75. Id. at 1045-46.
[Vol. 28:279
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should be capitalized under § 26376 by reasoning that there are other
methods of distinguishing between currently deductible and capital ex-
penses. 7 The Court concluded that creation of a separate and distinct
asset is not a prerequisite to classifying an expenditure as capital.78
Pointing out that Lincoln Savings addressed only the need for capitaliza-
tion where a separate asset was created, the Court did not discuss how to
treat an expenditure where no separate asset was created.79
In explaining its Lincoln Savings decision, the Court had to contend
with its own statement that "[w]hat is important and controlling ... is
that the [expenditure] serves to create ... a separate and distinct addi-
tional asset."80 Moreover, in Lincoln Savings the Court had gone so far
as to say that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some
future aspect is not controlling."'81 The majority of circuit courts under-
standably concluded from this language that the possibility of the exist-
ence of a future benefit is ignored in identifying capital expenditures.82
However, the Indopco Court clarified its Lincoln Savings language, stat-
ing that Lincoln Savings does not "prohibit reliance on future benefit[s]
as a means of distinguishing an ordinary business expense from a capital
expenditure." 83 The Court upheld and expanded its Lincoln Savings rul-
ing that capitalization is appropriate where a separate asset is created.
B. Significant Future Benefit Analysis
Basing its decision on underlying accounting principles, the lan-
guage of the Internal Revenue Code, and prior case law, the Supreme
Court determined that when significant future benefits exist, the expense
should be capitalized.
76. Id. at 1044 (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354
(1971)).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1044 (citing General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir.
1964)).
79. Id.
80. Lincoln Say., 403 U.S. at 354.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See supra notes 49, 53, 57, 58, 61 and accompanying text.
83. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044 (reasoning that if it ruled out the future benefit analysis and
focused exclusively on a separate and distinct asset, this would still not produce the bright-line rule
Indopco sought, due to the flexible and amorphous nature of an asset).
1992]
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1. Accounting Principles
In discussing the accounting principles that underlie the determina-
tion of whether an expenditure should be currently deducted or capital-
ized, the Court stated that "[t]he primary effect of characterizing a
payment as either a business expense or a capital expenditure [is that it
determines] the timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery." 84 Additionally,
the Code tries to achieve a more realistic calculation of net income for
tax purposes by matching expenses to their related revenues.8 5 The
lower courts that interpreted Lincoln Savings as creating a bright-line
rule failed to recognize these underlying accounting principles.86
Accrual basis accounting, one of the basic concepts underlying fi-
nancial reporting accounting,8 7 requires that expenses be matched with
income of the proper period. The notion of matching gives an accurate
reflection of net income for financial purposes, as well as a precise net
income figure for tax purposes.8 8 Therefore, when determining how to
treat expenditures, it is imperative to decide whether the expenses relate
to the income of the current period alone or if they contribute to income
of periods extending beyond the current period.
The Internal Revenue Code directs the allowance of deductions and
capitalization with regard to certain expenditures. Section 162(a) pro-
vides that a deduction shall be allowed for "all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business."89 Section 263 requires capitalization of an expense
84. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1042; see also Lee A. Sheppard, National Starch Decision Fails to
Remove Wrinkles From Capital Expense Issue, 89 TAx NOTES TODAY 160-68 (August 4, 1989)
(discussing the Lincoln Savings rule being inconsistent with accounting theory, but explaining that
accounting theory should not control tax results in every case. Business expenses are deductible in
the year incurred, whereas capital expenditures are depreciated or amortized over the determinable
useful life of the asset. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1042. Additionally, capital expenditures where no
specific asset or useful life can be ascertained are deducted only upon sale or dissolution of the
enterprise. Id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 167(a), 336(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a) (1991)).
85. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1043 (citing Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16
(1974); Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982)).
86. See supra notes 49, 53, 57, 58, 61 and accompanying text.
87. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6, 1 139-42
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1992). Some taxpayers report on a cash basis and some on accrual,
but the matching principle of accrual accounting applies to both cash and accrual methods. Id.
88. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Account-
ing Principles No. 4, § 121 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1970) (stating that an accurate
reflection of income depends upon current measurement of changes in economic resources and obli-
gations rather than on a simple recording of receipts and payments).
89. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1992). Examples of expenditures that are currently deductible under § 162
include expenses for (1) repairs and maintenance, (2) proxy fights, and (3) defending against a hostile
takeover (to the extent that it is necessary for protection). See I.R.C. § 162; Locke Mfr. Cos. v.
United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1965); Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
[Vol. 28:279
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss2/4
INDOPCO, INC. v. COMMISSIONER
when it results in the acquisition of property or a permanent improve-
ment of the property's value. 90 Under Section 263, expenses that pro-
duce tangible assets91 must be capitalized and depreciated over the useful
life of the asset.92 Expenses that produce intangible assets93 must be cap-
italized and amortized over the useful life of the asset.94 However, if an
intangible asset has no determinable useful life,95 then depreciation or
amortization deductions are disallowed because the expense cannot be
properly matched with the income of a certain period. Thus, expendi-
tures associated with intangible assets with no determinable useful life
cannot be recaptured by the taxpayer except through sale or
dissolution.96
Target corporations prefer takeover expenses to be currently deduct-
ible because the deduction would decrease net income in the period of the
takeover, and, therefore, substantially reduce taxes in the current period.
However, if the proper treatment is capitalization, where no separate as-
set with a determinable useful life is created,97 the expense associated
with friendly takeovers could not be deducted until the acquiring corpo-
ration is dissolved or liquidated. The taxpayer's desire for current deduc-
tions is understandable since it puts funds into the taxpayer's pocket
immediately, rather than at some indeterminate future date. However,
since underlying accounting principles support matching of expenses
with revenues, the expense cannot be currently deducted if the expense
provides a future benefit.
90. Id. § 263. Examples of expenditures which are capital in nature under § 263 include "[t]he
cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and equipment, furniture and
fixtures, and similar property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-2(a) (1992).
91. Tangible assets include buildings, equipment and property. ROBERT K. ESKEW & DANIEL
L. JENSEN, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 775-76 (2d ed. 1986).
92. Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 25,507 (1991).
93. Intangible assets with useful lives include patents and copyrights. See ESKEW & JENSEN,
supra note 96 at 772.
94. See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, supra note 92 at 142.
95. Intangible assets with no determinable useful life include reorganization expenses, stock
purchase expenses, and recapitalization expenses. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
397 U.S. 580 (1970); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); Interstate Transit Lines v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943).
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1992); Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 13,602-05 (1991). A tax
benefit occurs at sale through reduced taxable gain or increased deductible loss on the transaction
because the expenses are not deducted, but rather, increase the basis of the asset to an amount closer
to the amount realized from sale or dissolution. Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 13,602-05 (1991).
97. There was never an issue concerning whether the expenses incurred incident to this friendly
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2. Language of the Code
The Supreme Court construed the express language of Section 263
to determine if a future benefit analysis is proper. The Court stated that
"the text of the Code's capitalization provision, Section 263(a)(1), which
refers to 'permanent improvements or betterments,' itself envisions an
inquiry into the duration and extent of the benefits realized by the tax-
payer."9 The word "improvements" is defined generally as "everything
that permanently enhances the value of the premises for general uses." 99
It logically follows that if something is "permanently enhanced," it has
value in future periods. This definition encompasses the creation of a
separate asset; however, it extends further to include expenses where no
separate asset is created, but where there is value provided in future
years. The Court was correct in construing the language of the Code to
apply to the duration of benefits received.
3. Case Law
Lower court opinions prior to Lincoln Savings reasoned that a fu-
ture benefit is important in deciding whether to deduct or capitalize. In
General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 100 the Eighth Circuit stated
that "it has been held that, where the expenditures have not resulted in
the acquisition or increase of a corporate asset,.., these expenditures are
not, because of that fact, deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses." 0 1 This reasoning implies that even when no separate asset is
created, the expenditure may still be capitalized. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit would likely agree with the Indopco future benefit analysis.
The Supreme Court also consulted its own opinions written subse-
quent to Lincoln Savings in formulating its future benefit analysis. In
United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp.,1 02 the Supreme Court found
98. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
99. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Improvements § 1 (1968).
100. 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964).
101. Id. at 716 (citation omitted). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is in line with the Indopco
Court in this pre-Lincoln Savings opinion. However, subsequent to Lincoln Savings the Eighth Cir-
cuit, citing Lincoln Savings, stated that "[tihe fact that there may be some ensuing benefit and future
effect from the expenditure beyond the taxable year when paid is not controlling." Iowa-Des Moines
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979).
102. 405 U.S. 298 (1972). Here the expenses were not friendly takeover expenditures, but in-
stead were interest expenses paid on stock purchases required by the State of Louisiana. See id. at
299-300. These stock purchases were necessary under the Farm Credit Act of 1933 which provided
that members with loans are required to purchase $100 par value Class C stock of the bank equal to
but not less than 10% nor more than 25% of the amount of the quarterly interest that they paid to
the bank on their loans. Id. The taxpayers claimed a $99 interest expense deduction for every $100
stock purchase required by the statute ($1 was treated as the cost of acquiring a capital asset). Id. at
[Vol. 28:279
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that an expense which "is of value in more than one taxable year" is a
nondeductible capital expenditure. 10 3 The Court's authority in Missis-
sippi Chemical was its own Lincoln Savings decision, which corrected any
ambiguity regarding whether a separate asset must be created, or
whether a future benefit is sufficient for capitalization." 4 Clearly, the
circuit courts that relied on Lincoln Savings should have applied the Mis-
sissippi Chemical analysis in rendering their decisions.
C. Factors Constituting a Significant Future Benefit
Once the Indopco Court established that the existence of a signifi-
cant future benefit required capitalization of expenses incurred, the Court
then discussed the factors it used in determining that a future benefit had
in fact been created. A future benefit could be found where (1) a com-
pany would "'benefit greatly from the availability of... enormous re-
sources, especially in the area of basic technology,' ""5 (2) the affiliation
between the acquiring corporation and the target corporation would cre-
ate the opportunity for synergy due to "'the nature of the ... opera-
tions,' ,16 (3) the target corporation benefitted from transforming "from
a publicly-held, free-standing corporation into a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of [the acquiring corporation],"' 7 and (4) the transaction allowed
the target corporation "to eliminate previously authorized but unissued
shares of preferred [stock] and to reduce the total number of authorized
shares of common [stock]."1 8
Even though the IRS's private letter ruling recognized that this
transaction was not a reorganization but merely incidental to the stock
exchange, the Supreme Court said the same analysis applies to a corpo-
rate reorganization as to this friendly takeover.109 This is because they
both bear the indicia of capital expenditures due to being associated with
the corporation's operations and betterment "'for the duration of its
300. The district court and the Fifth Circuit found for the taxpayers. Id. The Supreme Court
reversed, basing its decision on the fact that "the security is of value in more than one taxable year,
[therefore] it is a capital asset within the meaning of § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, and its
cost is nondeductible." Id. at 310 (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S.
345 (1971); citing Old Colony R.R. v. United States, 284 U.S. 552 (1932); 26 C.F.R. § 1.461-1)).
103. Id. at 310.
104. Id.
105. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting National Starch's 1978 Progress Report).
106. Id.
107. Id. See Lynne A. Schewe et al., How to Establish Deductions for Friendly Takeover Costs by
Limiting National Starch, 74 J. TAX'N 146 (1991), for a full discussion on these factors and the
arguments made to refute them.
108. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
109. Id. at 1046.
1992]
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existence or for the indefinite future or for a time somewhat longer than
the current taxable year.' "110 Therefore, since the expenses incurred in-
cident to corporate restructuring are to be capitalized, the friendly take-
over expenses should also be capitalized.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INDOPCO DECISION
A. Effect on Hostile Takeovers
Prior to Indopco, expenses associated with hostile takeovers were
deductible."' 1 However, due to the Third Circuit's decision in National
Starch, the IRS withdrew Technical Advice Memorandum (T.A.M.) 89-
27-005,112 which allowed hostile takeover expenses to be deducted.113
This T.A.M. has been replaced with T.A.M. 90-43-003,14 which allows
a deduction for expenses associated directly with resisting a hostile take-
over. However, expenses incurred in obtaining a white knight," 5 where
110. Id. at 1045-46 (quoting General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715 (8th
Cir. 1964)).
111. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (July 7, 1989); see also Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,
114 (1933) (explaining that counsel fees in connection with "a lawsuit affecting the safety of a busi-
ness... are the common and accepted means of defense against attack."); Kenneth A. Rosenberg,
The Reluctant Bride" Tax Treatment of Costs of Resisting Corporate Takeovers, 13 J. CORP. TAX'N
114 (1986).
112. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (July 7, 1989); see also Corporate Takeovers - Expense De-
ductibility After National Starch and Chemical Corp. v. Comr., 23 TAX MGMT. (BNA) 311 (Nov. 6,
1989) (explaining the case in T.A.M. 89-27-005). This case dealt with a target corporation attracting
a "white knight" to purchase the target corporation, thereby escaping the hostile takeover by an
undesired corporation. Id. The T.A.M. allowed the amounts expended by the target corporation to
resist the takeover to be deducted. id. at 312. The T.A.M. reasoned that the expenditures were
incurred in furtherance of the fiduciary duty to resist the takeover because the takeover was not in
the best interest of the corporation or its shareholders. Id.
113. 49 TAX NomTs 637 (Nov. 5, 1990) (explaining that T.A.M. 89-27-005 was replaced with 89-
45-003. T.A.M. 89-45-003 required expenses associated with hostile takeovers to be capitalized. Id.
114. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990); see also Hostile Takeover You Win; Friendly
Takeover You Lose, 19 TAx'N FOR LAW. 242 (1991); (explaining the case in T.A.M. 90-43-003).
This case dealt with a company attempting a hostile takeover of a target corporation. Id. The target
corporation retained an investment banker to search for an alternative buyer with a similar strategic
business plan. Id. A buyer was eventually found, and the hostile pursuer agreed in a mutual release
to cease its efforts. Id.
The taxpayer contended that the dominant aspect of the transaction was defending the corpora-
tion against a hostile takeover, "and to protect its continuing policies and operations, and the ex-
penses would not have been incurred" except for the hostile takeover attempt. Id. The district
director argued "that the expenditures were attributable to a change in the taxpayer's capital struc-
ture." Id. It was found that the target corporation had two distinctly different strategies. Id. One
was to directly oppose the takeover efforts, "while the other was to gain some long-term protection
and stability through a friendly acquisition." Id. "Based on this, the expenses are to be examined
individually to determine under which strategy they were incurred." Id.
115. When an acquiring corporation pursues a hostile takeover of a target corporation, the target
corporation sometimes seeks another corporation, commonly known as a "white knight," to acquire
the target. The target corporation obtains the white knight because it believes that the white knight
14
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a successful defense follows, must be capitalized because a shift in owner-
ship has occurred and the company will benefit in the future."1 6 There-
fore, the expenses must be separated into hostile takeover defense
expenses (which are deductible) and expenses associated with obtaining a
white knight (which are to be capitalized). 17
Notwithstanding the most recent T.A.M., the expenses associated
with obtaining a white knight could be characterized as incidental to the
hostile takeover transaction and, therefore, deductible.I18 In Indopco,
the Tax Court concluded that expenses were incidental to the entire cor-
porate restructuring. However, since the dominant aspect of the transac-
tion was to be capitalized, the Court decided that the incidental white
night expenses would be capitalized as well.' Since expenses associated
with a white knight are incidental to defending the corporation, and since
expenses associated with defending a corporation are deductible, it fol-
lows that incidental white knight expenses should also be deductible.
However, the Supreme Court and the Code favor capitalization of
expenses incurred in transactions where a future benefit is provided, 120
regardless of whether the takeover is friendly or hostile.12 1 Thus, the
Supreme Court and the IRS agree that where a significant future benefit
is provided, the expense should be capitalized.
B. Effect on Currently Deductible Expenses that Provide Future
Benefits
The Indopco decision makes possible the capitalization of expendi-
tures which are currently deductible but provide a future benefit. Among
these expenditures are advertising costs. There are, of course, costs asso-
ciated with advertising that are clearly for a particular period.1 22 How-
ever, many advertising costs cannot be properly matched with a specific
is a better holder than the hostile pursuer. William L. Raby, Expenses That Benefit the Future:
Indopco & The "White Knights", 54 TAX NOTES 1648 (1992).
116. The IRS issued T.A.M. 89-45-003 in accordance with the National Starch decision, which
gives the Supreme Court even greater incentive to uphold the Third Circuit's opinion. See 49 TAx
NOTES 637 (Nov. 5, 1990).
117. Id.
118. The taxpayer in T.A.M. 90-43-003 did, in fact, argue that the dominant aspet of the trans-
action was the hostile defense, however, the court rejected this argument. 49 TAX NOTES 637 (Nov.
5, 1990). See also J. Phillip Adams & J. Dean Hinderliter, Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner: Impact
Beyond Friendly Takeovers, 55 TAX NOTES 93 (1992).
119. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 78 (1989).
120. Id. at 97.
121. 49 TAx NOTES 637 (Nov. 5, 1990).
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period. For example, advertising promotes sales, thereby supplying the
business with future profits and goodwill, both of which are future bene-
fits. Therefore, advertising often provides a future benefit which, follow-
ing Indopco's reasoning, would have to be capitalized. On the other
hand, the counterargument is that such costs only provide a future bene-
fit when they are significant enough to warrant capitalization.12
C. Effect on Other Friendly Takeover Cases
A close review of the Supreme Court's decision reveals that capitali-
zation occurs only when a significant future benefit is provided. The
Court relied upon specific facts in the Indopco case to determine that the
takeover produced significant future benefits, thus providing for capitali-
zation. Therefore, the decision did not make such an overly-broad rule
that all friendly takeover expenses must be capitalized.
In order to avoid the harsh ramifications of the capitalization of
friendly takeover expenses, corporations should attempt to create a bene-
fit the effects of which are seen immediately rather than at a future date.
Four factors are important in determining if a future benefit will be
obtained. 24
(1) "Form of transaction"125-This inquiry focuses on the different
means of acquiring a corporation: taxable asset acquisitions, taxable
stock acquisitions, tax-free reorganizations, stock purchases and redemp-
tions, recapitalizations, a combination of the above, and deemed asset
sales under Section 338 of the Code.' 26 In some instances a future benefit
is apparent; however, in some acquisitions, the transaction lacks a long-
term benefit. 127
(2) "Nature of the target corporation"12 8-This categorization re-
lates to the mutual characteristics of the acquiring and target corpora-
tions.129 For example, in Indopco, the two corporations were in the same
line of business.' 30 Therefore, Indopco stood to benefit in the future.
However, the acquiring corporation in another case could merely be a
123. "[Ihe mere presence of an incidental future benefit-'some future aspect'-may not war-
rant capitalization." Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
124. Schewe et al., supra note 107 at 149-50.
125. Id. at 149.
126. Id.
127. Id. An example would be a Section 338 transaction where the target corporation sells all its
stock to a new corporation as a taxable sale and then the target corporation completely liquidates
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financial investor not engaged in exactly the same business as the target
corporation, or could be a totally unrelated business. 131 In either case,
the acquisition would not necessarily produce future benefits for the tar-
get corporation. 13
2
(3) "Nature of the acquiring entity"' 3M-This categorization deals
with the characteristics of the acquiring entity.1 34 In Indopco, Unilever
had large capital resources and other significant business activities which
produced a synergistic opportunity for Indopco. 135 However, not all ac-
quiring corporations will provide such benefits.1
36
(4) "Events following the acquisition"'37-- This inquiry focuses on
the status of the companies after the restructuring. 131 In Indopco,
Unilever did not sell or modify the target corporation or cause the target
corporation to assume any significant debt obligations incident to the ac-
quisition. 39 However, in many other acquisitions, the acquiring entity
resells part or all of the acquired corporation or causes the target corpo-
ration to assume significant debt obligations. This causes the acquiring
corporation to experience significant financial problems after the acquisi-
tion which is obviously detrimental, not beneficial."
Some cases involving friendly takeover expenses might be distin-
guished from Indopco based on the significance of the future benefit.
14 1
This is doubtful, however, due to the fact that benefits are inherent in the
nature offriendly takeovers. Were they not expected to be beneficial, the
transactions would likely not occur. Furthermore, the Indopco Court
analogized friendly takeover expenses to reorganization expenses, giving






135. Id. at 149-50.





141. Id. at 151.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Indopco did not create the hard and fast rule
that the lower courts were seeking. Instead, it established the future ben-
efit test which determines if an expenditure should be capitalized. In so
holding, the Court did not overrule the Lincoln Savings decision, but in-
stead expanded Lincoln Savings to include the capitalization of expenses
which provide a significant future benefit where no separate and distinct
asset is created.
Indopco could perhaps be applied to other expenses; however, the
Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stressing that the expenses asso-
ciated with friendly takeovers are comparable to those associated with
corporate restructuring. Expenses associated with both have to do with
the "corporation's operations and betterment" '142 and are not deductible.
Therefore, the Court correctly limited the Indopco opinion to friendly
takeovers that involve expenditures which produce a significant future
benefit.
Stacy D. Ward
142. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1046.
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